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1. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy settings allow users to exercise a certain degree of control over who can 
access the information they share through Online Social Networks (OSNs).1 
Unfortunately, research has shown that many users do not bother to change their privacy 
settings or remain unaware of the actual audiences with whom their data is shared. In 
addition, OSNs are corporations with a commercial imperative to set the default to obtain 
as much personal data as possible.2 Consequently, even if the user selects certain privacy 
settings, the website’s default settings might still operate beyond the users’ expectations.3 
Privacy-friendly default settings have been put forth as a way to alleviate part of 
the burden placed on individuals.4 Such settings have pre-selected values which are 
designed to respect the users’ privacy and that no further actions are required from them 
to be sufficiently protected.5 The concept of “privacy by default” has also been recognised 
by the European Commission in their proposal for a general Data Protection Regulation.6 
Once the Regulation comes into force, the OSN provider will have to implement both 
safeguards into the design of the platform as well as privacy-friendly default settings.7 
The legal framing of default settings has already been analysed extensively in a 
previous deliverable.8 The objective of this deliverable is to provide more practical 
guidelines for the appropriate configuration of privacy-friendly default settings. It starts 
by summarizing the relevance of default settings from a behavioural economics 
perspective. Next, an inventory is made of the current default settings offered by main 
OSN providers. The guidelines themselves will cover 6 main elements, namely: (1) 
awareness and active choice; (2) granularity; (3) audience visibility; (4) simplicity; (5) 
user expectations and (6) proportionality.  
 
                                                        
1 I. Byrnside, “Six Clicks of Sepparation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites 
to Research Applicants”, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 2008, 10, as cited by P. 
Lambert, Social Networking: Law, Rights and Policy, Dublin, Clarus Press, 3 April 2014, 105. 
2 P. Lambert, Social Networking: Law, Rights and Policy, Dublin, Clarus Press, 3 April 2014, 107. 
3 Idem. 
4 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. 
5 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design and the Emerging Personal Data Ecosystem, October 2012, 18,  
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/10/pbd-pde.pdf; J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. 
Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 
February 2013, 24. 
6 Article 23 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation), COM/2012/011 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011.  
7 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 30. 
8 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 23. 
2. THE RELEVANCE OF DEFAULT SETTINGS 
Privacy blunders happen every day. Very often, these blunders are the result of 
poorly configured privacy settings. In the context of OSNs, there are several factors which 
may influence users’ configuration of privacy settings, including: 
- pre-existing default settings; 
- incomplete information; 
- cognitive and behavioural biases; and 
- invisibility of audiences. 
 
2.1. The “power of default” 
Behavioural economics research has shown that many individuals do not bother 
to change their privacy settings.9 The Article 29 Working Party has likewise stressed that 
only a minority of the OSN users that have signed up to a service will actually change their 
default settings.10 One reason for this could be that users are simply not aware of the 
possibility to tweak their settings.11 Other possible explanations include motivational 
limitations and time constraints.12  
 
2.2. Incomplete information 
Privacy choices are often affected by incomplete information.13 In an OSN 
environment, there are information asymmetries which hinder individuals’ privacy 
decision-making as only a subset of parties has knowledge of the relevant information.14 
The OSN provider is the only party that fully grasps the amount of data that is being 
collected, for which purposes and which third parties have access.15 Thus, many times, 
                                                        
9 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making”, IEEE Security & 
Privacy, vol3, No 1, January/February 2005, 27; S. Livingstone, “Taking Risky opportunities in youthful 
content creation: teenagers’ use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression”, New 
Media and Society 10 (2008).  
10 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. 
11 A. Acquisti and R. Gross, “Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and  
Privacy on the Facebook” in G. Danezis, P. Golle (eds.), Privacy-Enhancing Tech.: 6Th Int’L Workshop, vol. 36 
(2006), http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/ projects/facebook/facebook2.pdf; S. Livingstone, “Taking 
Risky opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers’ use of social networking sites for intimacy, 
privacy and self-expression”, New Media and Society 10 (2008).  
12 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making”, IEEE Security & 
Privacy, vol3, No 1, January/February 2005, 27. 
13 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented as 
Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, 1-2. 
14 I. Adjerid, A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, G. Loewenstein, “Sleights of Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the 
Limits of Transparency, Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (Soups) 2013, 24-26 July 2013, Newcastle, 
UK, 2; A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented 
as Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, 2. 
15 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making”, IEEE Security & 
Privacy, vol3, No 1, January/February 2005, 27; R. Balebako, P.G. Leon, H. Almuhimendi, P.G. Kelly, J. Mugan, 
users do not know with whom and more importantly for which purpose their data is being 
used and how this may affect them. Transparent privacy policies that provide clear 
information can help reduce information asymmetries to some extent.  Nevertheless, their 
practical implementation is such that many users fail to derive meaningful information 
from them.16  
Incomplete information leads to increased complexity of privacy decision-making. 
As stated by ACQUISTI and GROSSKLAGS, “the complexity of the privacy decision environment 
leads individuals to arrive at highly imprecise estimates of the likelihood and consequences 
of adverse events, and altogether ignore privacy threats and modes of protection”.17  As a 
result, the actual outcome of user choices often does not reflect their expectations. 
 
2.3. Cognitive and behavioral biases 
Even if individuals were to have complete information, they would be faced with 
other factors complicating their privacy choices. It has been argued that individuals can 
only rationalise to a certain extent about data which is available to them (i.e., “bounded 
rationality”).18 Finding information costs time and energy, especially in relation to 
complex decisions like the protection of personal data. Bounded rationality limits OSN 
users’ ability to collect and process all relevant information. Given that the tangible and 
intangible consequences of privacy decisions are difficult to estimate, individuals rely on 
heuristics and draw inaccurate conclusions from past choices.19 In addition, individuals 
are inclined to be overconfident and tend to underestimate risks, especially when they do 
not immediately experience consequences.20 Finally, individuals are susceptible to the 
way in which information is presented to them (“framing”), as well as to the specific 
timing of the information provision.21 HELBERGER for example, argues that individuals tend 
                                                        
A. Acquisti, L.F. Cranor and N. Sadeh, “Nudging Users Towards Privacy on Mobile Devices”, CHI 2011, May 7 
- 12 2011, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 1.  
16 See also B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kosta and J. Dumortier, “Privacy notices versus informational self-
determination: Minding the gap”, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 2013, p. 5 et seq.  
17 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented as 
Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, 3. 
18 M.A. Eisenberg, “The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract”, 47(2) Stanford Law Review, 1995, 
214; H.A. Simon, “Models of bounded rationality. Trustme: Anonymous management of trust relationships 
in decentralize P2P systems”, in N. Shahmehri, R.L. Graham & G. Caronni (Eds.), Peer-to-peer computing, 
Washington DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 142-149; E. Wauters, E. Lievens, P. Valcke, D1.2.4: A legal 
analysis of Terms of Use of Social Networking Sites, including a practical legal guide for users: ‘Rights & 
obligations in a social media environment’, 19 December 2013, 8, www.emsoc.be. 
19 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented as 
Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, 6; A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in Individual 
Decision Making”, IEEE Security & Privacy, vol3, No 1, January/February 2005, 27; I. Adjerid, A. Acquisti, L. 
Brandimarte, G. Loewenstein, “Sleights of Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the Limits of Transparency, 
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (Soups) 2013, 24-26 July 2013, Newcastle, UK, 2. 
20 E. Wauters, V. Donoso and E. Lievens, “Why are Terms of Use so difficult to understand? Reflections on 
how to optimize transparency for users in Social Networking Sites”, EuroCPR, Brussels, 24-25 March 2014, 
2. 
21 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented as 
Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, 7; E. Wauters, V. Donoso, E. Lievens and P. Valcke, “Re-designing & re-
to forget information when it is not yet relevant to them (e.g., the beginning of the signing-
up process), and therefore posits that information should instead be provided in the right 
portions and in the right context.22  These cognitive and behavioural biases affect OSN 
users’ decision making and causes them to deviate from so-called rational privacy 
decisions.23 
2.4. Invisibility of audiences 
A fourth important element which influences the decision-making of OSN users is 
the nature of OSNs. Its specific characteristics, like the invisibility of audiences, have been 
designed to increase the sharing of information.24 Research has shown that, for instance, 
Facebook users cannot accurately estimate who is actively following them on the OSN.25 
Due to this lack of social transparency, OSN users are not sufficiently aware of the possible 
consequences of their online sharing habits. In other words, they might be sharing more 
information than they would if they were actually aware of who is watching their online 
behaviour.   
                                                        
modeling Social Network terms, policies, community guidelines and charters: Towards a user-centric 
approach”, EMSOC Project, 31 March 2014, 34, available on www.emsoc.be.  
22 N. Helberger, “Form Matters: Informing Consumers Effectively, 15 November 2013, Amsterdam Law 
School Research Paper No. 2013-71, 24 available on http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354988. 
23 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented as 
Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, p. 5 et seq. 
24 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 20. 
25 M.S. Bernstein, E. Bakshy, M. Burke and B. Karrer, “Quantifying the Invisible Audience in Social Networks”, 
CHI 2013, April 27–May 2, 2013, Paris, France, 2. 
3. INVENTORY OF CURRENT DEFAULT SETTINGS 
Privacy settings are access control mechanisms (hereinafter “ACM”) which allow 
users to decide who can access their “user data”.26 An ACM is the formalisation of how 
policies are composed based on a specific set of features in the system, regulating and 
authorising access to data.27 They are a means of diminishing privacy and security risks 
of unauthorised access to the data in information systems. Essentially, OSN users have the 
possibility to select their preferred privacy settings and each of these settings define 
which group of people receives access to the information shared on that person’s profile. 
They can either select an audience from a predefined set of groups (e.g., Friends, Friends 
of Friends, only me, Public), or customise their own audience. The table below provides 
an overview of the possible settings of a selection of social networks.28 
 
Social 
Network 
Default 
settings 
regulating 
access by 
users 
Other 
possible 
settings 
regulating 
access by 
users 
 
 
Interesting to note 
Default 
settings 
regulating 
access by 
OSN 
providers  
Default settings 
regulating 
access by third 
parties 
Facebook Friends (for new 
users29). 
 
 
However, certain 
“basic” profile 
information is 
always publicly 
available (name, 
profile and cover 
pics, networks, 
gender, username 
and user id).30 
Public, Friends 
only, Friend of 
friends, 
custom. 
 
 
Users are allowed to 
define the audience for 
each post separately. 
When new users post 
something for the first 
time, they can select their 
audience for that 
particular post, if they 
don’t select anything 
their info is shared with 
friends only. If they do 
change the audience for 
that post, for instance to 
public, this change will 
be sticky, which means 
Access to all 
user data. 
These 
settings are 
wired-in so 
they can’t be 
changed. 
 
These data 
may be freely 
shared within 
the family of 
companies 
that are part 
User data may be 
used by the following 
third parties: 
1. Advertising, 
measurement and 
analytics services in 
“non-personally 
identifiable form”.32 
 
2. “We transfer 
information to 
vendors, service 
providers, and other 
partners who globally 
                                                        
26 This includes both basic profile information and additional information that the OSN user adds to his or 
her profile. 
27 R. Sayaf & D. Clarke, “Access Control Models For Online Social Networks”, 2, in L. Caviglione et al. (eds), 
IGI Global, 2012 accessible at 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/373507/1/ACMs%20in%20OSNs.pdf.  
28 This table was last updated on 5 December 2014. 
29 For existing users this used to be public. 
30 Facebook, Information we receive and how it is used, last visited 15 October 2014, www.facebook.com.  
This public information can also show up when someone does a search on Facebook or on another search 
engine, see https://www.facebook.com/help/203805466323736.  
32 https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/update.  
that future posts will also 
be shared publicly. 
of 
Facebook.31 
support our 
business”33 
This setting is wired-
in, so it cannot be 
changed. 
Twitter Public Private (tweets 
will only be 
available to 
approved 
followers). 
Users with a private 
account cannot answer to 
tweets of people that are 
not following them. 
Access to all 
data related 
to the user. 
 
 
Service providers, 
sellers of goods and 
services, affiliates, 
advertisers (public 
info). 
Instagram Public Private 
(approved 
followers) 
Posts can't be set to 
private from a desktop 
computer at this time. 
 
Find friends: users can 
choose to search contacts 
through their contact 
list/other OSNs, to which 
Instagram would then 
receive access. 
Access to all 
data related 
to the user. 
 
User data may be 
shared with affiliates, 
service providers, 
third-party 
advertising 
companies 
(wired-in).34 
Snapchat My Friends  Everyone, 
Custom (as 
regards who 
can view my 
story, not who 
can send me 
snaps). 
Snapchat may “collect 
information from your 
device’s phonebook and 
photos” but only with the 
user’s consent. 
Additionally, Snapchat 
may share information 
about a user with other 
users who have this 
person’s phone number 
in their device 
phonebook. “For instance, 
when you use Find 
Friends, we may share 
your username and name 
with other users who use 
Find Friends and have 
your phone number in 
their device phonebook.” 
Access to: 
basic profile 
information 
(e.g., 
password, 
username, 
date of birth, 
email), usage 
info (e.g., 
time, date, 
sender, 
recipient of a 
message), 
content 
info35, device 
info, device 
phonebook 
and photos, 
location info, 
1. Analytics 
advertising services 
provided by third 
parties: “We may let 
other companies use 
cookies, web beacons, 
and other 
technologies on 
Snapchat. These 
companies may 
collect information 
about how you use 
the Services and other 
websites and online 
services over time 
and across different 
services. The 
information collected 
may include unique 
                                                        
31 Including: Facebook Payments Inc, Atlas, Instagram LLC, Mobile Technologies Inc., Onavo, Parse, Moves, 
Oculus, LiveRail, WhatsApp Inc., https://www.facebook.com/help/111814505650678.  
33 Facebook does not provide a list of data that might be shared with these third parties, 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/update.  
34 http://instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/#section3.  
35 In this regard, Snapchat does not guarantee that messages are deleted within a specific timeframe, data 
and states that “even after we’ve deleted message data from our servers, that same data may remain in backup 
for a limited period of time”. Furthermore, Snapchat admits in its privacy policy that there “there may be ways to 
access messages while still in temporary storage on recipients’ devices or, forensically, even after they are 
deleted.”, see https://www.snapchat.com/privacy.  
info collected 
by cookies, 
website log 
info. 
 
device identifiers, 
device manufacturer 
and operating system, 
IP address, browser 
type, pages viewed, 
session start/stop 
time, links clicked, 
and conversion 
information. This 
information may be 
used to, among other 
things, analyze and 
track data, determine 
the popularity of 
certain content, and 
better understand 
your online activity. 
Data may be shared 
with vendors, 
consultants and other 
service providers who 
need access to such 
information to carry 
out work on behalf of 
snapchat” 
(wired-in).36 
 
 
Ello Public37 / Ello is invitation only, 
therefore potential users 
must request an 
invitation. 
 
Users can opt-out of the 
use of Google Analytics 
and Ello also respects 
“Do not track” browser 
settings.  
Access to 
general, non-
identifiable 
information 
about what 
pages you 
access, your 
general 
geographic 
location (e.g., 
a city, but not 
a street 
address), the 
device you 
are using, an 
anonymized 
version of 
your IP 
address, the 
Google Analytics (but 
users have the 
possibility to opt-out). 
 
“We may share your 
information, including 
personal information, 
with third parties 
under several 
circumstances, 
including  
(1) if you tell us it is 
OK to do so  
 
(2) if we believe that 
we need to do so to 
comply with 
applicable law or legal 
obligations  
                                                        
36 Snapchat does not clarify what kind of data is being shared https://www.snapchat.com/privacy.  
37 This is the only option Ello provides for its users. “Users should assume that anything you post or upload 
on the Site other than private messages will be accessed by the public.” https://ello.co/wtf/post/privacy.  
address of 
web sites that 
refer you to 
the site, email 
address and 
UserID.  
 
(3) if we contract with 
a third party service 
provider to offer 
services for you — for 
example, with a credit 
card processing 
company if you decide 
to buy something 
through the Site. 
Ello does not have any 
affiliated companies 
right now. But if we 
do in the future, we 
may share 
information with 
them, too.38 
 
  
  
                                                        
38 https://ello.co/wtf/post/privacy.  
4. GUIDELINES FOR PRIVACY-FRIENDLY DEFAULT SETTINGS 
4.1. Awareness and active choice 
Only a limited number of OSN users changes their default settings or is even aware 
that these settings can be tweaked.39 Awareness is the first step towards making informed 
privacy decisions. Therefore, it is important that OSN providers look at ways to increase 
the level of awareness of the users of their services. This can be achieved, for instance, by 
providing sufficient information about the default settings and other possible choices 
when they sign up for the service, or when they decide to change them.  
Active choice can further enhance user awareness. Active choice implies that users 
must “freely and specifically consent to any access to their profile's content that is beyond 
their self-selected contacts”.40 In other words, OSN providers should wait for an affirmative 
action of the user before sharing his or her information to a broader audience than just 
“friends” or “connections”. Active choice also implies that no changes should be made to 
default settings without the user’s affirmative consent. Mere notification of changes is not 
enough.41  
Privacy-friendly 
 When users join the OSN, they are clearly informed about the different 
functionalities of their privacy settings and actively stimulated to customise them. 
 Require an affirmative action of the user for every change in settings. 
Not privacy-friendly 
 Implementing changes in settings without the users’ explicit consent. 
 Changing the default from private to public and only notifying users after the fact.  
4.2. Granularity 
Granularity of privacy settings determines how much control a user may exercise 
over the sharing of his or her personal data.42 Granular settings allow OSN users to specify 
what parts of their user data should be accessible to others.43 In practice, many OSN 
providers offer only two options for OSN users: they can either choose to make their 
                                                        
39 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 15.  
40 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. 
41 See also A. Kuczerawy and F. Coudert, “Privacy Settings in Social Networking Sites: Is It Fair?” in S. Fischer-
Hübner et al. (Eds.), Privacy and Identity 2010, IFIP AICT 352, 235. 
42 R. Balebako, P.G. Leon, H. Almuhimendi, P.G. Kelly, J. Mugan, A. Acquisti, L.F. Cranor and N. Sadeh, “Nudging 
Users Towards Privacy on Mobile Devices”, CHI 2011, May 7 - 12 2011, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 3. 
43 The Oxford Dictionary defines granularity as “the scale or level of detail in a set of data”, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/granularity.  
profile information publicly available or keep it entirely private.44 Such an absence of 
further granularity might urge users to make more information visible to public than they 
would otherwise.45 On the other hand, it should be taken into account that an 
overabundance of choices might bury the important settings.46 For instance in Facebook’s 
new ‘privacy basics’ information47, there are several granular settings regulating access 
by other OSN users, which might confuse users. To set the right level of granularity, a 
balancing exercise is necessary.  
Privacy-friendly  
 Make sure the privacy settings provide a sufficient level of granularity.  
 Allow and stimulate customised settings, whereby users can easily and exactly 
select a specific audience for their posts and other parts of their profile.48 
 Allow users to exercise control over the use of their personal information by the 
OSN provider and third parties. 
 Enable users to exercise some control over the information about them that is 
being posted by fellow users (e.g., by requiring prior approval for a photo tag by 
default).  
Not privacy-friendly 
 Present users with an all-or-nothing choice in relation to the access by other OSN 
users and third parties. 
 Only mention privacy risks resulting from other consumers accessing the 
information (without mentioning risks resulting from the collection and use by 
other third parties).49  
 Offering an overabundance of choices regulating access by other users as this 
might confuse users 
                                                        
44 For instance ,Twitter and Instagram only provide those two options. The platform Ello does not even 
provide an option for its users, as the public setting is wired-in. 
45 R. Balebako, P.G. Leon, H. Almuhimendi, P.G. Kelly, J. Mugan, A. Acquisti, L.F. Cranor and N. Sadeh, “Nudging 
Users Towards Privacy on Mobile Devices”, CHI 2011, May 7 - 12 2011, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 3. 
46 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 22. 
47 Facebook Privacy Settings and Tools, last consulted on 8 December 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=privacy.  
48 Facebook for instance allows this possibility for each post, however it does not for other elements like a 
specific picture in an album.  
49 For instance, Facebook, Google+. 
4.3. Audience visibility  
OSN users often underestimate their actual audience when disclosing personal 
information on their profiles.50 One way to increase ‘social transparency’ is by improving 
audience visibility. 51 Tools such as Freebu52 make it easier to see which people belong to 
which groups. Another way to increase audience visibility is to display to the user a subset 
of the contacts who will be able to view certain content before he or she posts it. Such 
“social transparency” tools can encourage users to take a more cautious approach to 
online information sharing, as they are forced to think about who is actually watching or 
listening.  
Privacy-friendly 
 Provide indications of how many people can really view a picture or read a 
statement. 
 Facilitate grouping and audience management (e.g., Freebu). 
Not privacy-friendly 
 Offering an abundance of choices regulating access by other users to distract users 
from the fact that there are no options to regulate access by the OSN provider or 
third parties. 
4.4. Simplicity 
Configuring privacy settings should be easy. A simple, logical and comprehensive 
privacy pane is necessary, so that OSN users can easily determine how their settings will 
impact the visibility of their information. At the same time, it is also important to provide 
users with the right information and choice at the moment of decision-making. Users 
should therefore be able to customize settings at the moment of information sharing.  
Privacy-friendly 
 Make the privacy pane as simple and logical as possible and provide 
understandable explanations.  
 Enable configuration of the settings at the moment of content sharing. 
                                                        
50 In most OSNs the only signs of interaction are likes or comments. See M.S. Bernstein, E. Bakshy, M. Burke 
and B. Karrer, “Quantifying the Invisible Audience in Social Networks”, CHI 2013, April 27–May 2, 2013, 
Paris, France, 9. 
51 Social transparency has been defined as the availability of social meta-data surrounding information 
exchange. See H. C. Stuart , L. Dabbish, S. Kiesler, P. Kinnaird and R. Kang, “Social Transparency in Networked 
Information Exchange: A Framework and Research Question”, CSCW’12, 11-15 February 2012, Seattle, 
Washington, USA. 
52 Freebu is an online application, which helps to create your own Facebook friend-lists (audience 
management) and offers four interactive visualisations. 
Not privacy-friendly 
 Using legalese while explaining default settings. 
 Scattering settings across a myriad of pages making it difficult for individuals to 
configure. 
4.5. User expectations and societal values 
Default settings should reflect user expectations. Expectations of the OSN user 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis, as there is no one-size-fits-all solution. 
Different social networking platforms can create different expectations. For instance as 
regards Facebook, it could be reasonable to expect that statements or other information 
posted by an OSN user on his profile page, is by default shared amongst this user’s friends. 
Conversely, a platform such as Twitter might not trigger the same expectations, as it is 
promoted as a public discussion forum. Similarly, if a user has opted for a restricted access 
profile, internal search engines should also respect this choice by default.53 
Finally, it is important to note that when minors join OSN platforms, additional 
protection might be necessary. For instance, it has been argued that it would be more 
appropriate to, instead of defining a privacy-friendly default setting, have a privacy-
friendly setting wired-in for minors (e.g., make profiles of minors only accessible to 
friends). 54   
Privacy-friendly 
 Limiting the amount of “basic profile information” which is public by default, 
including the number of connections.55 
 Restricted access profiles should remain hidden when using internal search 
engines. This also includes searches by specific parameters like age or location.56 
 Profiles of minors should only be accessible to friends  
 
 
                                                        
53 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. 
54 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 23.  
55 The reason for this is that in a certain social media context, for instance in the case of LinkedIn, users are 
actually encouraged to add as many connections as possible, as this might be beneficial in the job searching 
process. Consequently, information is being disclosed to more people, which might increase the risk to 
privacy infringements. See R. Balebako, P.G. Leon, H. Almuhimendi, P.G. Kelly, J. Mugan, A. Acquisti, L.F. 
Cranor and N. Sadeh, “Nudging Users Towards Privacy on Mobile Devices”, CHI 2011, May 7 - 12 2011, 
Vancouver, BC, Canada, 3.  
56 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf.  
Not privacy-friendly 
 Choosing an unfair default setting which causes users to unwillingly disclose 
personal information.57 
 Allowing all “basic profile information” to be public by default, without taking into 
account user expectations. 
 
4.6. Don’t be intrusive 
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) techniques, such as facial recognition and in depth 
content analysis, can offer considerable insights into individual’s behavior. While these 
techniques can be used for benign purposes, they also have a substantial impact on 
individuals’ privacy. For example: Facebook’s Artificial Intelligence Research lab has 
recently been experimenting with software that would be able to distinguish between 
“drunk” and “sober” pictures. Using this technology, the OSN could warn its users and thus 
prevent them from uploading potentially embarrassing pictures. 58 However, one can 
question whether such techniques are really necessary to achieve this objective. Less 
intrusive nudging techniques (such as increased audience visibility or introducing a 
timer) may already substantially mitigate risks of reckless posting. In any event, it would 
seem appropriate that individuals not be subjected to such techniques by default, but only 
after an affirmative choice. 
Privacy-friendly 
 Use of non-intrusive nudging techniques (e.g., increased audience visibility). 
Not privacy-friendly 
 Using facial recognition to automatically link pictures to individuals without their 
permission 
 Using in depth content analysis and AI without their express consent. 
 
  
                                                        
57 For instance the FTC received a complaint against the peer-to-peer company FrostWire. According to the 
FTC, “Frostwire had configured the application’s default settings so that, immediately upon installation and 
set-up, it would publicly share users’ photos, videos, documents, and other files stored on those devices”, see  
Facebook offers solution to end drunken posts” http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2011/10/peer-peer-file-sharing-software-developer-settles-ftc-charges.  
 
58 D. Lee, “Facebook offers solution to end drunken posts”, BBC News Technology, 11 December 2014, 
accessible at  http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30432493  
5. CONCLUSION 
Privacy-friendly default settings can help mitigate risks of inadvertent disclosure.  
Nevertheless, OSN users should be clearly informed about the different functionalities of 
their privacy settings and actively stimulated to customize them. In absence of an 
affirmative choice, profile content should only be available to the user’s self-selected 
contacts.  
When creating default settings, OSN providers should first of all define the 
appropriate level of granularity. On the one hand, offering too little choice may lead to 
excessive disclosure. On the other hand, too much choice may be confusing or 
overwhelming. OSN providers should make privacy choices as simple intuitive as 
possible, both through comprehensive privacy panes and ‘just-in-time’ configuration. 
Audience management is a challenge for many OSN users. OSN providers should 
therefore strive to ensure audience visibility and provide tools which help users to decide 
which groups of individuals should have access to which information.  
Finally, OSN providers should continue to take into account users’ expectations 
when introducing new features. While sophisticated forms of content analysis may yield 
new insights, they may also be seen as intrusive. Allowing individuals to choose before 
they are subject to new features will help keep users’ expectations of privacy intact. 
 
